Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening ? A model of tax competition
AbstractMost work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal witholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2002052.
Date of creation: 00 Sep 2002
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tax competition; tax coordination; witholding tax;
Other versions of this item:
- Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre & Sato, Motohiro, 2003. "Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 451-458, November.
- MARCHAND, Maurice & PESTIEAU, Pierre & SATO, Motohiro, . "Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening? A model of tax competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1648, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau & Motohiro Sato, 2002. "Can Partial Fiscal Coordination Be Welfare Worsening? A model of tax competition," CREPP Working Papers 0205, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
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- Jun-ichi Itaya & Makoto Okamuraz & Chikara Yamaguchix, 2009. "Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting," Working Papers 2009/15, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Sven Wehke, 2007.
"Fighting Tax Competition in the Presence of Unemployment: Complete versus Partial Tax Coordination,"
FEMM Working Papers
07010, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Sven Wehke, 2008. "Fighting Tax Competition in the Presence of Unemployment: Complete versus Partial Tax Coordination," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 64(1), pages 33-62, March.
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