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Welfare and Distribution Effects of Bank Secrecy Laws

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Author Info
Frode Brevik ()
Manfred Gärtner ()

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Abstract

We analyze an overlapping-generations world comprising two groups of small countries whose preferences for public spending differ. Key steady-state effects from introducing bank secrecy and a withholding tax in countries with low government spending are: a reduction of global capital and income, a shift of wealth towards bank-secrecy countries, and falling consumption, welfare and government spending despite rising tax rates in the rest of the world. Qualitative results are robust to changes in tax-payer honesty, the Leviathan effect (permitting governments to drive public spending higher than citizens prefer), and the fraction of withholding taxes repatriated to countries of residence.

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File URL: http://www.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2005/DP-07_G.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen in its series University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 with number 2005-07.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2005:2005-07

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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  3. Ellen R. McGrattan & Edward C. Prescott, 2003. "Average Debt and Equity Returns: Puzzling?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 392-397, May. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre & Sato, Motohiro, 2003. "Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 451-458, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jermann, Urban J., 1998. "Asset pricing in production economies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 257-275, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S103-26, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 39-72, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2004. "The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-competition Paradox," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(1), pages 83-106, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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