Can Partial Fiscal Coordination Be Welfare Worsening? A model of tax competition
Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal witholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.
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- Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
- CREMER, Helmuth & FOURGEAUD, Virginie & LEITE MONTEIRO, Manuel & MARCHAND, Maurice, 1995.
"Mobility and Redistribution : A Survey,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1995066, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 1999. "Can Tax Coordination Work?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(3/4), pages 443-, July.
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