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Does equalization transfer enhance partial tax cooperation?

Author

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  • Wang, Wenming
  • Kawachi, Keisuke
  • Ogawa, Hikaru

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of equalization transfer scheme on partial tax cooperation condition in a repeated game setting. It is shown that in order to achieve partial tax cooperation between two capital-rich (exporting) countries, the full equalization transfer scheme is superior to the partial equalization transfer scheme, whereas in order to achieve partial tax cooperation between two capital-poor (importing) countries, the partial equalization transfer scheme is superior to the full equalization transfer scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Wenming & Kawachi, Keisuke & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2017. "Does equalization transfer enhance partial tax cooperation?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 431-443.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:51:y:2017:i:c:p:431-443
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.06.009
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    Cited by:

    1. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Hikaru Ogawa, 2020. "International capital market and repeated tax competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 751-768, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partial tax cooperation; Full equalization transfer; Partial equalization transfer; Repeated game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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