A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition
AbstractModels of tax competition usually assume a single period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition, and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interaction between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization can not prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way out is to set up a central fiscal authority.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite Aix-Marseille III in its series G.R.E.Q.A.M. with number 99a34.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.
Web page: http://www.greqam.fr/
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TAXATION ; FISCAL POLICY ; ENTERPRISES;
Other versions of this item:
- Cardarelli, R. & Taugourdeau, E. & Vidal, J.-P., 1999. "A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition," Papiers d'Economie MathÃÂ©matique et Applications 1999.73, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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