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A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition

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Author Info
Cardarelli, R.
Taugourdeau, E.
Vidal, J.-P.

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Abstract

Models of tax competition usually assume a single period framework. This paper sets up a repeated interactions model of tax competition, and establishes conditions under which fiscal policy harmonization can result from repeated interactions between governments. It is shown that fiscal policy harmonization can not prevail when regional asymmetries are too strong. In such a case, the only way out is to set up a central fiscal authority.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications with number 1999.73.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pariem:1999.73

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Postal: France; Universite de Paris I - Pantheon- Sorbonne, 12 Place de Pantheon-75005 Paris, France
Web page: http://cermsem.univ-paris1.fr/
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Related research
Keywords: COMPETITION ; INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ; TAXATION;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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  1. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2002. "Factor Mobility and Redistribution: A Survey," IDEI Working Papers 154, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
  2. Thierry Warin & André Fourçans, 2006. "Tax Competition and Information Sharing in Europe: A Signaling Game," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0605, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. SALMON, Pierre, 2005. "Horizontal competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2005-02, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marco CATENARO & Jean-Pierre VIDAL, 2006. "Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  5. Killian McCarthy & Frederik van Doorn & Brigitte Unger, 2008. "Globalisation, Tax Competition and the Harmonisation of Corporate Tax Rates in Europe: A Case of Killing the Patient to Cure the Disease?," Working Papers 08-13, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sailesh Gunessee, 2009. "Strategic Tax Competition: An Experimental Study," ICBBR Working Papers 5, International Centre for Behavioural Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. André Fourçans & Thierry Warin, 2001. "Tax Harmonization versus Tax Competition in Europe: A Game Theoretical Approach," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 132, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alexandre A. Porsse & Eduardo A. Haddad & Eduardo P. Ribeiro, 2006. "Modeling Interjurisdictional Tax Competition In A Federal System," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 54, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
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