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Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

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Author Info
Marco CATENARO (European Central Bank)
Jean-Pierre VIDAL (European Central Bank)
Abstract

In the context of a stylised gaine theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a coordinated outcome can be the solution to the non cooperative tax game. This resuit suggests that explicit forms of policy coordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2006011.

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Length: 14
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2006011

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Related research
Keywords: Policy coordination; international fiscal issues;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Cardarelli, R. & Taugourdeau, E. & Vidal, J.-P., 1999. "A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99a34, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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  6. Signe Krogstrup, 2003. "Are Capital Taxes Racing to the Bottom in the European Union?," HEI Working Papers 01-2003, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]
  7. Coates, Dennis, 1993. "Property tax competition in a repeated game," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 111-119, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jun-ichi Itaya & Makoto Okamuraz & Chikara Yamaguchix, 2009. "Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting," Working Papers 2009/15, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB). [Downloadable!]
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