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The Dynamics of the Location of Firms – A Revisit of Home-Attachment under Tax Competition

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  • Yutao Han

    ()
    (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)

  • Patrice Pieretti

    ()
    (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)

  • Benteng Zou

    ()
    (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)

Abstract

We revisit the investment home-bias situation of firms and extend the home attachment setting of Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Ogura (2006) into a dynamic framework. We locate firms based on their home attachment preferences, which is also changing over time based on some updated spillover information. Some applications, in static and dynamic tax competition, are presented following our home-attachment principle.

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File URL: http://wwwfr.uni.lu/content/download/62867/796582/file/2013-15%20-%20The%20Dynamics%20of%20the%20Location%20of%20Firms%20-%20A%20Revisit%20of%20Home-Attachment%20under%20Tax%20Competition.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg in its series CREA Discussion Paper Series with number 13-15.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:13-15

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Keywords: Dynamic tax competition; Home attachment; Foreign direct investment-disinvestment;

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References

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  1. Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti & Skerdilajda Zanaj & Benteng Zou, 2011. "Asymmetric Competition among Nation States. A differential game approach," CREA Discussion Paper Series, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg 11-19, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  2. Jean, HINDRIKS & Susana, PERALTA & Sholmo, WEBER, 2006. "Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques), Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques 2006062, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  3. Streeten, Paul, 1993. "The special problems of small countries," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 197-202, February.
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  6. Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti & Benteng Zou, 2013. "On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure," Working Papers, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics 476, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  7. Ogura, Laudo M., 2006. "A note on tax competition, attachment to home, and underprovision of public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 252-258, March.
  8. Kenneth R. French & James M. Poterba, 1991. "Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets," NBER Working Papers 3609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  12. Patrice Pieretti & Skerdilajda Zanaj & Benteng Zou, 2012. "On the long run economic performance of small economies," CREA Discussion Paper Series, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg 12-14, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
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  15. Cardarelli, R. & Taugourdeau, E. & Vidal, J.-P., 1999. "A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 99a34, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  16. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Okamura, Makoto & Yamaguchi, Chikara, 2008. "Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2403-2411, December.
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  18. Marco CATENARO & Jean-Pierre VIDAL, 2006. "Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) 2006011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  19. Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  20. Figueiredo, Octavio & Guimaraes, Paulo & Woodward, Douglas, 2002. "Home-field advantage: location decisions of Portuguese entrepreneurs," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 341-361, September.
  21. Tesar, Linda L. & Werner, Ingrid M., 1995. "Home bias and high turnover," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 467-492, August.
  22. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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