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On the long run sustainability of small jurisdictions

Author

Listed:
  • Skerdilajda Zanaj

    (CREA, University of Luxembourg)

  • Patrice Pieretti

    (CREA, University of Luxembourg)

  • Benteng Zou

    (CREA, University of Luxembourg)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse the long run sustainability of a small jurisdiction open to capital flows. Policy instruments used to reach an efficient steady state (when possible) are capital taxes and attractive public infrastructures. We first show that there exists one long run efficient equilibrium which is saddle-point stable. If capital mobility is high enough, the small economy is always able to converge to a long run efficient state by a one-shot adjustment of the share of taxes allocated to infrastructure. If capital mobility is too low, convergence to long run efficiency may be impossible. In this case, an eventual economic collapse can occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Skerdilajda Zanaj & Patrice Pieretti & Benteng Zou, 2021. "On the long run sustainability of small jurisdictions," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 48(1), pages 15-35, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:epolin:v:48:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s40812-020-00153-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s40812-020-00153-y
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic dynamics; Foreign direct investments; Spatial dynamic competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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