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Asymmetric Competition among Nation States: A Differential Game Approach

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Author Info

  • Yutao Han

    (CREA, Université du Luxembourg)

  • Patrice Pieretti

    (CREA, Université du Luxembourg)

  • Skerdilajda Zanaj

    (CREA, Université du Luxembourg)

  • Benteng Zou

    ()
    (CREA, Université du Luxembourg)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small country's economy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and infrastructure competition within a differential game framework between two unequally sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more flexible in their political decision making than larger countries. However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional capacity in the provision of public goods. The model shows that the long-term outcome of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility. In particular, we show that flexibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the beneficial effect of flexibility in a small state increases with its inefficiency in providing public infrastructure and with the degree of international openness.

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File URL: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-460.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 460.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:460

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Keywords: Tax/Infrastructure competition; Open-loop/Markovian strategies; Differential games;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti & Benteng Zou, 2013. "The Dynamics of the Location of Firms – A Revisit of Home-Attachment under Tax Competition," CREA Discussion Paper Series 13-15, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  2. Han, Yutao & Pieretti, Patrice & Zou, Benteng, 2013. "An extension of the home-attachment criteria under dynamic tax competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 508-510.

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