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Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

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  • Konrad, Kai A.

Abstract

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries. -- Diese Arbeit untersucht Steuerwettbewerb als Stackelberg-Spiel. Als zentrales Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass die Einführung einer unteren Grenze für die Höhe der von Ländern wählbaren Steuersätzen zu einer Senkung der Steuersätze im Gleichgewicht führen kann. Die politisch häufig geforderte Einführung von Mindeststeuersätzen im Bereich der internationalen Kapitalbesteuerung kann also im Vergleich zur angestrebten Wirkung genau die gegenteiligen Effekte haben.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number SP II 2008-10.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200810

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Related research

Keywords: Corporate income; capital income; taxation; tax competition; minimum tax; tax coordination; Stackelberg;

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References

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  1. You-Qiang Wang, 1999. "Commodity Taxes under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 974-981, September.
  2. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber & Jack Mintz, 2003. "Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 956, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd & Mintz, Jack, 2005. "Capital Mobility and Tax Competition," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 1-62, December.
  4. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
  5. Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2003. "Coordination of Capital Taxation Among Asymmetric Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 3695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Rosanne Altshuler & Timothy J. Goodspeed, 2002. "Follow the Leader? Evidence on European and U.S. Tax Competition," Departmental Working Papers 200226, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti & Benteng Zou, 2013. "On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure," Working Papers 476, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  2. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2013. "The economics and empirics of tax competition: A survey," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 163, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  3. Hikaru Ogawa, 2013. "Further analysis on leadership in tax competition: the role of capital ownership," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 474-484, June.
  4. Becker, Johannes & Fuest, Clemens, 2012. "Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 146-148.
  5. Áron Kiss, 2012. "Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(5), pages 641-649, October.

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