Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition
AbstractIn a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries. -- Diese Arbeit untersucht Steuerwettbewerb als Stackelberg-Spiel. Als zentrales Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass die Einführung einer unteren Grenze für die Höhe der von Ländern wählbaren Steuersätzen zu einer Senkung der Steuersätze im Gleichgewicht führen kann. Die politisch häufig geforderte Einführung von Mindeststeuersätzen im Bereich der internationalen Kapitalbesteuerung kann also im Vergleich zur angestrebten Wirkung genau die gegenteiligen Effekte haben.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number SP II 2008-10.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Corporate income; capital income; taxation; tax competition; minimum tax; tax coordination; Stackelberg;
Other versions of this item:
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 109-111, February.
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
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