Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

A Quantitative Analysis of Tax Competition v. Tax Coordination under Perfect Capital Mobility

Contents:

Author Info

  • Enrique G. Mendoza

    (University of Maryland and NBER)

  • Linda L. Tesar

    (University of Michigan and NBER)

Abstract

Theory predicts that strategically-determined tax rates induce negative externalities across countries in relative prices, the wealth distribution and tax revenue. This paper studies the interaction of these externalities in a dynamic, general equilibrium environment and its effects on quantitative outcomes of tax competition in one-shot games over capital income taxes between two governments that set time-invariant taxes and issue debt. Strategic payoffs correspond to welfare gains net of the cost of transitional dynamics in a standard neoclassical two-country model with exogenous balanced growth. The model is calibrated to European data for the early 1980s starting from a benchmark with symmetric countries. When countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, the Nash equilibrium replicates calibrated taxes, suggesting that European taxes can be the outcome of Nash competition. When consumption taxes are adjusted to maintain fiscal solvency, competition triggers a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes but this outcome is welfare-improving relative to calibrated taxes. Sensitivity analysis shows that competition can produce a “race to the top” in capital taxes and that the United Kingdom can benefit from tax competition with Continental Europe. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination in all of these experiments are small.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers501-525/r507.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan in its series Working Papers with number 507.

as in new window
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:507

Contact details of provider:
Postal: ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN 48109
Web page: http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "To harmonize or to compete? That's not the question," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 335-349, June.
  2. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "International Coordination of Fiscal Policy in Limiting Economies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 617-36, June.
  3. Chamley, Christophe, 1981. "The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation in a Growing Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(3), pages 468-96, June.
  4. Francesco Daveri & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 15(30), pages 47-104, 04.
  5. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
  6. Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model," Munich Reprints in Economics 19402, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  7. V.V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model," Staff Report 160, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe," Munich Reprints in Economics 19846, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Razin, Assaf & Tesar, Linda L., 1994. "Effective tax rates in macroeconomics: Cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 297-323, December.
  10. Cooley, T.F. & Hansen, G.D., 1991. "The Distortions in a Neoclassical Monetary Economy," Papers 91-01, Rochester, Business - General.
  11. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1990. "Integration of the International Capital Markets: The Size of Government and Tax Coordination," NBER Working Papers 2863, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  13. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria & Asea, Patrick, 1997. "On the ineffectiveness of tax policy in altering long-run growth: Harberger's superneutrality conjecture," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 99-126, October.
  14. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Supply-Side Economics: An Analytical Review," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 293-316, April.
  15. Keen, Michael & Marchand, Maurice, 1997. "Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 33-53, October.
  16. Paul Klein & Per Krusell & José-V�ctor R�os-Rull, 2008. "Time-Consistent Public Policy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 789-808.
  17. Wildasin, D.E., 1987. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1987020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  18. Huizinga, H. & Nielsen, S.B., 1995. "Capital Income and Profits Taxation with Foreign Ownership of Firms," Papers 9582, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  19. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Jacob Frenkel & Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1991. "International Taxation in an Integrated World," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061430, December.
  21. R. Barrell & R. Anderton & J. Morgan & N. Vaughan & JW in't Veld, 1994. "The World Economy," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 149(1), pages 30-52, August.
  22. Haufler,Andreas, 2001. "Taxation in a Global Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521782760, October.
  23. Huber, Bernd, 1999. "Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum income tax model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 441-458, March.
  24. Wolfgang Eggert, 1999. "International Percussions of Direct Taxes," Finance 9904001, EconWPA.
  25. Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod, 1990. "Taxation in the Global Economy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number razi90-1, May.
  26. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1991. "Tax competition and tax coordination : when countries differ in size," Policy Research Working Paper Series 738, The World Bank.
  27. Lopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angel, 1998. "On welfare and revenue effects of indirect tax harmonization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 185-193, August.
  28. Dani Rodrik & Tanguy van Ypersele, 1999. "Capital Mobility, Distributive Conflict, and International Tax Coordination," NBER Working Papers 7150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Razin, A. & Sadka, E., 1991. "International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Competition," Papers 3-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  30. King, Robert G. & Plosser, Charles I. & Rebelo, Sergio T., 1988. "Production, growth and business cycles : I. The basic neoclassical model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 195-232.
  31. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1990. "Integration of International Capital Markets: The Size of Government and Tax Coordination," NBER Chapters, in: Taxation in the Global Economy, pages 331-356 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. De Bonis, Valeria, 1997. "Regional integration and factor income taxation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1849, The World Bank.
  33. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Søren Bo, 2004. "Must losing taxes on saving be harmful?," Working Papers 15-2004, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  2. Eva de Francisco, 2005. "Limited Participation, Income Distribution and Capital-Account Liberalization: Working Paper 2005-02," Working Papers 16302, Congressional Budget Office.
  3. Rehme, Günther, 2006. "Economic growth and (re-)distributive policies in a non-cooperative world," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 25541, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
  4. Souleymane COULIBALY, 2008. "Empirical Assessment of the Existence of Taxable Agglomeration Rents," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 08.01, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  5. Coenen, Günter & McAdam, Peter & Straub, Roland, 2007. "Tax reform and labour-market performance in the euro area: a simulation-based analysis using the New Area-Wide Model," Working Paper Series 0747, European Central Bank.
  6. Enrique G. Mendoza & Linda L. Tesar, 2004. "Winners and Losers of Tax Competition in the European Union," Working Papers 508, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  7. Alexandre A. Porsse & Eduardo A. Haddad & Eduardo P. Ribeiro, 2006. "Modeling Interjurisdictional Tax Competition In A Federal System," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 54, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  8. Eva de Francisco, 2005. "Limited Participation, Income Distribution and Capital Account Liberalization," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 454, Society for Computational Economics.
  9. Dimitris Papageorgiou, 2009. "Macroeconomic Implications of Alternative Tax Regimes: The Case of Greece," Working Papers 97, Bank of Greece.
  10. Desai, Mihir A. & Foley, C. Fritz & Hines, James Jr., 2006. "Do tax havens divert economic activity?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 219-224, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:507. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (FSPP Webmaster).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.