Beyond the traditional debates over information exchange vs flat taxation at source, legislative advances have produced interesting innovations and suggestions concerning how to tax international savings. We examine some of these advances, which we then use to set forth and investigate a proposal for European and international savings taxation. That proposition combines the outcome of a recent Dutch reform and lessons from the US qualified intermediaries mechanism. We show that such a system exhibits the same desirable properties as exchange of information, but potentially at reduced compliance cost, and is sustainable within a repeated game framework.
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Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 1340.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
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