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Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

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Author Info
Michael Keen ()
Jenny Ligthart ()

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Abstract

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 13 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 163-180
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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:13:y:2006:i:2:p:163-180

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

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Related research
Keywords: international tax competition; international tax evasion; information exchange; withholding taxes;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Nico A. Hansen & Anke S. Kessler, 2001. "The Political Geography of Tax H(e)avens and Tax Hells," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1103-1115, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Andreas Haufler, 1996. "Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 5-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 435-457, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Philippe Bacchetta & María Espinosa, 2000. "Exchange-of-Information Clauses in International Tax Treaties," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 275-293, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2002. "Residence-Based Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and Why it is Not," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 465-482, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bacchetta, Philippe & Espinosa, Maria Paz, 1995. "Information sharing and tax competition among governments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 103-121, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Wilson, John Douglas, 1987. "Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(4), pages 835-56, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Huizinga, Harry & Nicodeme, Gaetan, 2004. "Are international deposits tax-driven," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1093-1118, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Michael Keen & David Wildasin, 2004. "Pareto-Efficient International Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 259-275, March. [Downloadable!]
  11. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 39-72, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2004. "The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-competition Paradox," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 106(1), pages 83-106, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2001. " A Simple Model of Commodity Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 103(4), pages 599-623, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Razin, A. & Sadka, E., 1991. "International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Competition," Papers 3-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christian Keuschnigg & Martin Dietz, 2007. "A growth oriented dual income tax," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 191-221, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Peter Birch Sørensen, 2006. "The Theory of Optimal Taxation: What is the Policy Relevance?," EPRU Working Paper Series 06-07, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter Birch Sørensen, 2006. "Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?," EPRU Working Paper Series 06-06, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Keen, M. & Ligthart, J.E., 2004. "Information sharing and international taxation," Discussion Paper 117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Peter Birch Sørensen, 2006. "Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Killian McCarthy & Frederik van Doorn & Brigitte Unger, 2008. "Globalisation, Tax Competition and the Harmonisation of Corporate Tax Rates in Europe: A Case of Killing the Patient to Cure the Disease?," Working Papers 08-13, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Søren Bo, 2004. "Must losing taxes on saving be harmful?," Working Papers 15-2004, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Carone, Giuseppe & Nicodème, Gaëtan & Schmidt, Jan, 2007. "Tax revenues in the European Union: Recent trends and challenges ahead," MPRA Paper 3996, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Thomas Hemmelgarn & Gaetan Nicodeme, 2009. "Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing the First Years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive," Taxation Papers 18, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Davies, Ronald & Norback, Pehr-Johan & Tekin-Koru, Ayca, 2007. "The Effect of Tax Treaties on Multinational Firms: New Evidence from Microdata," MPRA Paper 6031, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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