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Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer

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Author Info

  • Michael Keen

    ()

  • Jenny Ligthart

    ()

Abstract

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a—probably ‘the’—central issue on the international tax policy agenda. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation—away from parametric tax coordination and towards strengthening information exchange—has gone largely unnoticed in the public finance literature. This paper gives an overview of this increasingly important area of international taxation, reviewing the key economic, legal, and practical concepts and issues bearing on the analysis and implementation of information exchange, and providing an account of recent policy initiatives and emerging theoretical insights. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-006-3090-7
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 13 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 81-110

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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:13:y:2006:i:1:p:81-110

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

Related research

Keywords: tax information exchange; tax competition; international tax evasion; tax treaties; money laundering; savings tax directive;

References

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  1. Konrad, Kai A. & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 1999. "Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 156-167, July.
  2. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2003. "The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox," CoFE Discussion Paper 03-07, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
  3. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2002. "Residence-Based Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and Why it is Not," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 465-482, August.
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  9. Bacchetta, Philippe & Espinosa, Maria Paz, 1995. "Information sharing and tax competition among governments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 103-121, August.
  10. H. Huizinga & Ga�tan Nicod�me, 2001. "Are international deposits tax-driven?," European Economy - Economic Papers 152, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  11. Janeba, Eckhard & Smart, Michael, 2003. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 259-80, May.
  12. Yaniv, Gideon, 1994. "Taxation and Dirty Money Laundering," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 40-51.
  13. Miltiadis Makris, 2003. "International Tax Competition: There is No Need for Cooperation in Information Sharing," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 555-567, 08.
  14. Keen, M. & Ligthart, J.E., 2004. "Information Sharing and International Taxation," Discussion Paper 2004-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  15. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 163-180, May.
  16. Janeba,Eckhard, 1991. "Corporate income tax competition,Double taxation treaties, and foreign direct investment," Discussion Paper Serie A 361, University of Bonn, Germany.
  17. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  18. Michael Keen & David Wildasin, 2004. "Pareto-Efficient International Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 259-275, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Chu, Hsun, 2013. "Tax Enforcement Policy and the Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Tax Havens," MPRA Paper 53021, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2013.
  2. Keen, M. & Ligthart, J.E., 2004. "Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation," Discussion Paper 2004-54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Valpi Fitzgerald, 2012. "Mercados globales de capitales, impuestos directos y redistribución de la renta," Revista de Economía Crítica, Asociación de Economía Crítica, vol. 13, pages 55-73.
  4. Carone, Giuseppe & Nicodème, Gaëtan & Schmidt, Jan, 2007. "Tax revenues in the European Union: Recent trends and challenges ahead," MPRA Paper 3996, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Ligthart, Jenny E., 2007. "Information sharing for consumption tax purposes: An empirical analysis," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 24-42, March.
  6. Katarzyna Bilicka & Clemens Fuest, 2012. "With which countries do tax havens share information?," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/06, European University Institute.
  7. John Wilson, 2012. "Should remittances be taxed or subsidized?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 539-553, August.
  8. Katarzyna Bilicka & Clemens Fuest, 2014. "With which countries do tax havens share information?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 175-197, April.
  9. Thomas Hemmelgarn & Gaëtan Nicodème, 2009. "Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing the First Years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive," Working Papers CEB 09-023.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  10. Bernardi, Luigi, 2006. "A family of big brother that do not talk each other," MPRA Paper 1867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Killian J. McCarthy & Frederik van Doorn & B. Unger, 2008. "Globalisation, Tax Competition and the Harmonisation of Corporate Tax Rates in Europe: A Case of Killing the Patient to Cure the Disease?," Working Papers 08-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
  12. Wilson, John Douglas, 2011. "Brain-drain taxes for non-benevolent governments," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 68-76, May.
  13. FitzGerald, Valpy, 2013. "The international fiscal implications of global poverty reduction and global public goods provision," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  14. Schwarz, Peter, 2009. "Why are countries reluctant to exchange information on interest income? Participation in and effectiveness of the EU Savings Tax Directive," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 97-105, June.
  15. Lukas Hakelberg, 2014. "The Power Politics of International Tax Cooperation. Why Luxembourg and Austria accepted automatic exchange of information on foreign account holders’ interest income," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers p0375, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
  16. Wilson, John Douglas, 2008. "A voluntary brain-drain tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2385-2391, December.
  17. Luca Salvadori & José María Durán-Cabré & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2013. "Empirical Evidence On Tax Information Sharing Among Sub-Central Administrations," ERSA conference papers ersa13p461, European Regional Science Association.

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