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On Recent Developments in Fighting Harmful Tax Practices

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  • Nicodème, Gaëtan

Abstract

The recent uncovered cases of tax evasion in the European Union and the United States have revived the fight against harmful tax practices and spurred impressive progress in the adoption of international standards on information exchange. This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on harmful tax practices and information exchange on the size and consequences of the existence of tax havens and harmful tax regimes. The paper also describes the multilateral approaches developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union and examines recent developments in fighting harmful tax practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicodème, Gaëtan, 2009. "On Recent Developments in Fighting Harmful Tax Practices," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 62(4), pages 755-771, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:62:y:2009:i:4:p:755-71
    DOI: 10.17310/ntj.2009.4.08
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    Cited by:

    1. Hsun Chu & Chu-Chuan Cheng & Yu-Bong Lai, 2015. "A political economy of tax havens," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(6), pages 956-976, December.
    2. Haufler, Andreas & Lülfesmann, Christoph, 2015. "Reforming an asymmetric union: On the virtues of dual tier capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 116-127.
    3. George R. Zodrow, 2019. "Capital Mobility and Capital Tax Competition," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: George R Zodrow (ed.), TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE Selected Essays of George R. Zodrow, chapter 18, pages 543-570, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Barrios, Salvador & d'Andria, Diego & Gesualdo, Maria, 2020. "Reducing tax compliance costs through corporate tax base harmonization in the European Union," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    5. Grottke, Markus & Kittl, Maximilian, 2016. "First the stick, then the carrot? A cross-country evaluation of the OECD's initiative against harmful tax competition," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe B-21-16, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    6. Egger, Peter H. & Wamser, Georg, 2015. "The impact of controlled foreign company legislation on real investments abroad. A multi-dimensional regression discontinuity design," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 77-91.

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