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Profit Tax Competition and Formula Apportionment

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Author Info
Ruediger Pethig ()
Andreas Wagener ()

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Abstract

We analyse tax competition with corporate income taxes in a common market where tax revenues are allocated according to an apportionment formula. Generally, tax competition is sharper (i.e., equilibrium tax rates are lower) the more tax-elastic is the apportionment formula. This depends on the properties of production technologies. In particular: (i) With fixed labour input, tax competition is sharpest if apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by the sales- and payroll-shares. (ii) If capital and labour are endogenous and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, tax competition under the property- and the payroll-share rule is sharper than under the sales-share formula. Factor elasticities determine whether payroll- or property-share apportionment generates sharper tax competition.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1011.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1011

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Related research
Keywords: tax competition; formula apportionment;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  2. Goolsbee, Austan & Maydew, Edward L., 2000. "Coveting thy neighbor's manufacturing: the dilemma of state income apportionment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 125-143, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Wolfgang Eggert & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2003. "Symmetric Tax Competition under Formula Apportionment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 439-446, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Weiner, Joann, 2002. "Formula Apportionment in the European Union: A Dream Come True or the EU's Worst Nightmare?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten & Ziad, Abderrahmanne, 2005. "Existence of equilibria in a basic tax-competition model," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. S¯ren Bo Nielsen & Pascalis Raimondos-M¯ller & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2003. "Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 419-437, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Gordon, Roger H & Wilson, John Douglas, 1986. "An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1357-73, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. European Commission, 2001. "Company Taxation in the Internal Market," Taxation Studies 0005, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marcel Gérard, 2006. "Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, a Tentative Appraisal," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marco Runkel & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2007. "The Choice of Apportionment Factors under Formula Apportionment," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  3. Albert van der Horst & Leon Bettendorf & Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, 2007. "Will Corporate Tax Consolidation improve Efficiency in the EU ?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-076/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Clemens Fuest & Thomas Hemmelgarn & Fred Ramb, 2007. "How would the introduction of an EU-wide formula apportionment affect the distribution and size of the corporate tax base? An analysis based on German multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(5), pages 605-626, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Thomas Eichner & Marco Runkel, 2008. "Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals in a General Equilibrium Model," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Marcel Gerard, 2006. "Reforming the taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, "Coopetition" in a Bottom-up Federation," Working Papers 2006-10, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Christian Traxler & Andreas Reutter, 2008. "Apportionment, Fiscal Equalization and Decentralized Tax Enforcement," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jan Thomas Martini & Rainer Niemann & Dirk Simons, 2007. "Transfer Pricing or Formula Apportionment? Tax-Induced Distortions of Multinationals’ Investment and Production Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Fuest, Clemens & Hemmelgarn, Thomas & Ramb, Fred, 2006. "How would formula apportionment in the EU affect the distribution and the size of the corporate tax base? An analysis based on German multinationals," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,20, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  10. Joann Martens Weiner, 2005. "Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada," Taxation Papers 8, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
  11. Thiess Buettner & Nadine Riedel & Marco Runkel, 2008. "Strategic Consolidation under Formula Apportionment," Working Papers 0827, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Marcel Gérard, 2005. "Multijurisdictional Firms and Governments’ Strategies under Alternative Tax Designs," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  13. Ana Agundez-Garcia, 2006. "The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base for Multi-jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: a Review of Issues and Options," Taxation Papers 9, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission, revised Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
  14. Thomas Eichner & Marco Runkel, 2006. "Corporate Income Taxation of Multinationals and Unemployment," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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