This paper investigates the choice of apportionment factors under a corporate tax system of Formula Apportionment. In contrast to perceived wisdom, we show that the apportionment formula contains both mobile (capital) and immobile (labor) factors if jurisdictions are granted full fiscal autonomy with respect to tax rates and the formula design. A welfare gain can be realized by delegating the decision over apportionment factors to a central planner (centralization), while at the same time allowing jurisdictions fiscal autonomy in setting tax rates. However, the central planner uses the formula as a corrective instrument to internalize fiscal externalities and, therefore, uses mobile apportionment factors as well.
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Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 2072.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
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