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Tax evasion,tax corruption and stochastic growth

Author

Listed:
  • Fred Celimene

    (CEREGMIA, Université des Antilles et de la Guyane)

  • Gilles Dufrenot

    (Aix-Marseille Université)

  • Gisele Mophou

    (CEREGMIA, Université des Antilles et de la Guyane)

  • Gaston N'Guerekata

    (Morgan State University, Baltimore, MD, USA)

Abstract

This paper presents a continuous time stochastic growth model to study the effects of tax evasion and tax corruption on the level and volatility of private investment and public spending. Our results suggest that there do exist several regimes of mean growth and growth volatility, depending upon the consumer's degree of risk aversion, the tax income yield, the risk-adjusted return of the agent's portfolio, the productivity of public spending. We find that public spending is described asymptotically by an incomplete upper Gamma distribution, while private capital is described by a power law distribution. Depending upon the values of the parameters of these distributions, growth can be characterized by extreme values (high volatility) when the return to taxation lies under a certain threshold and/or when the risk-adjusted return of investing the proceeds of illegal activities evolves above a given threshold. We provide an empirical illustration of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Fred Celimene & Gilles Dufrenot & Gisele Mophou & Gaston N'Guerekata, 2013. "Tax evasion,tax corruption and stochastic growth," Documents de Travail 2013-05, CEREGMIA, Université des Antilles et de la Guyane.
    • Handle: RePEc:crg:wpaper:dt2013-05
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    File URL: http://www2.univ-ag.fr/RePEc/DT/DT2013-05_Celimene_al.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Zhu, Jun & Ho, Kung-Cheng & Luo, Sijia & Peng, Langchuan, 2023. "Pandemic and tax avoidance: Cross-country evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    3. Célimène, Fred & Dufrénot, Gilles & Mophou, Gisèle & N'Guérékata, Gaston, 2016. "Tax evasion, tax corruption and stochastic growth," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 251-258.
    4. Jurušs Māris, 2017. "Criteria for Defining Tax Evasion as Tax Terrorism," Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 30(1), pages 102-112, April.
    5. Mohammad Nurunnabi, 2018. "Tax evasion and religiosity in the Muslim world: the significance of Shariah regulation," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 371-394, January.
    6. Dzhumashev, Ratbek & Levaggi, Rosella & Menoncin, Francesco, 2023. "Optimal tax enforcement with productive public inputs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    7. Bethencourt, Carlos & Kunze, Lars, 2020. "Social norms and economic growth in a model with labor and capital income tax evasion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 170-182.
    8. Rind, Asad Ali & Abbassi, Wajih & Allaya, Manel & Hammouda, Amira, 2022. "Local peers and firm misconduct: The role of sustainability and competition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    9. Leonardo Barros Torres & Jaylson Jair da Silveira, Gilberto Tadeu Lima, 2022. "To Comply or not to Comply: Persistent Heterogeneity in Tax Compliance and Macroeconomic Dynamics," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2022_04, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    10. Tarverdi, Yashar & Saha, Shrabani & Campbell, Neil, 2019. "Governance, democracy and development," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 220-233.
    11. Leonardo Barros Torres & Gilberto Tadeu Lima & Jaylson Jair da Silveira, 2024. "Endogenous Tax Compliance and Macroeconomic Performance Driven by Satisficing Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2024_10, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    12. Gaetano T. Spartà & Gabriele Stabile, 2018. "Tax compliance with uncertain income: a stochastic control model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 261(1), pages 289-301, February.
    13. Bayramov, Vugar & Abbas, Gulnara, 2017. "Oil shock in the Caspian Basin: Diversification policy and subsidized economies," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 149-156.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models

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