Public Goods, Corruption And Growth???
AbstractIn this paper, we analyse implications of corruption on growth. We extend existing growth models by incorporating ubiquitous corruption as a by-product of the public sector. Corruption affects both taxation and public good provision, and therefore causes income redistribution and inefficiencies in the public sector. These effects of corruption lead to lower growth through distortions of investment incentives and resources allocation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number 15/06.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia
Web page: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E20 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O41 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2009-07-17 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-07-17 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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