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Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation

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  • Kessing, Sebastian G.

    ()
    (University of Siegen)

  • Konrad, Kai A.

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)

Abstract

Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to non-welfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1545.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2006, 90(1-2), 393-402
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1545

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Keywords: labor unions; work hours; optimal income taxation;

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References

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  1. Boadway, R. & Marceau, N. & Marchand, M., . "Investment in education and the time inconsistency of redistributive tax policy," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1219, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1994. "A Theory of the Welfare State," NBER Working Papers 4856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Diamond, P., 1994. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Exemple with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," Working papers 94-14, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Dillen, Mats & Lundholm, Michael, 1996. "Dynamic income taxation, redistribution, and the ratchet effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 69-93, January.
  5. Homburg, Stefan, 2002. "The Optimal Income Tax: Restatement and Extensions," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-252, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  6. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Introduction to "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings"," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 1-4 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
  8. Andersson, Fredrik, 1996. "Income taxation and job-market signaling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 277-298, February.
  9. Saez, Emmanuel, 2001. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 205-29, January.
  10. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-20, September.
  11. Konrad, Kai A, 1994. "The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Public Provision of Public Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 79-92, February.
  12. Emmanuel Saez, 2000. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," NBER Working Papers 7708, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-65, February.
  14. Shulamit Kahn & Kevin Lang, 1987. "Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency vs. Specific-Capital," NBER Working Papers 2238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Konrad, Kai A., 2001. "Privacy and time-consistent optimal labor income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 503-519, March.
  16. Bourguignon, F. & Spadaro, A., 2000. "Social Preferences Revealed through Effective Marginal Tax Rates," DELTA Working Papers 2000-29, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  17. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  18. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
  19. Shulamit Kahn & Kevin Lang, 1992. "Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency Versus Specific-Capital," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 27(4), pages 661-678.
  20. Agell, J. & Lommerud, K.E., 1990. "Union Egalitarianism As Income Insurance," Papers 1990a, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  21. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
  22. Homburg, Stefan, 2002. "Optimal Marginal Tax Rates for Low Incomes: Positive, Negative, or Zero?," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-255, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  23. John M. Evans & Douglas C. Lippoldt & Pascal Marianna, 2001. "Trends in Working Hours in OECD Countries," OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers 45, OECD Publishing.
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