This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Public Provision of Public Goods

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Konrad, Kai A

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

When people know that a public good is to be privately provided in the future, economic behavior may change in periods before the one with the private provision game. Individuals have a distortionary incentive to reduce their disposable income so as to shift the burden of provision to others. The incentive is eliminated if the government provides a sufficient amount of the public good. In a second-best world, private provision of public goods has been claimed to be a reasonably good alternative to public provision. This claim needs to be reconsidered in light of these results. Copyright 1994 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0427%28199402%292%3A61%3A241%3C79%3ATSAOBP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 61 (1994)
Issue (Month): 241 (February)
Pages: 79-92
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:61:y:1994:i:241:p:79-92

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0013-0427
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0013-0427

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Epstein, Gil S. & Hillman, Arye L., 2000. "Social Harmony at the Boundaries of the Welfare State: Immigrants and Social Transfers," IZA Discussion Papers 168, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. John Stranlund, 1996. "On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 1-22, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Epstein, Gil S & Gang, Ira, 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 3585, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Sebastian G. Kessing & Kai A. Konrad, 2005. "Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1545, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Eirik Kristiansen & Marcel Thum, 1997. "R&D incentives in compatible networks," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 55-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Ramayya Krishnan & Michael D. Smith & Zhulei Tang & Rahul Telang, 2007. "Digital Business Models for Peer-to-Peer Networks: Analysis and Economic Issue," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 6(2), pages 194-213, June. [Downloadable!]
  7. Rainald Borck, 2001. "Investment and the tragedy of the commons," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4, pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  8. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2005. "Contests, NGOs and Decentralizing Aid," IZA Discussion Papers 1711, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2003. "Aggregative Public Good Games," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2003/05, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Leah Brooks, 2006. "Volunteering To Be Taxed: Business Improvement Districts And The Extra-Governmental Provision Of Public Safety," Departmental Working Papers 2006-04, McGill University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.