When people know that a public good is to be privately provided in the future, economic behavior may change in periods before the one with the private provision game. Individuals have a distortionary incentive to reduce their disposable income so as to shift the burden of provision to others. The incentive is eliminated if the government provides a sufficient amount of the public good. In a second-best world, private provision of public goods has been claimed to be a reasonably good alternative to public provision. This claim needs to be reconsidered in light of these results. Copyright 1994 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 61 (1994) Issue (Month): 241 (February) Pages: 79-92 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
plain text,
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)