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Access regulation and cross-border mergers: Is international coordination beneficial?

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Author Info
Lommerud, Kjell Erik () (Department of Economics, University of Bergen)
Olsen, Trond E. () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
Straume, Odd Rune () (Department of Economics, University of Bergen)

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Abstract

The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-coordinated policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and is this then an argument for international coordination of such policies? The paper addresses this issue in a setting where firms must have access to a transportation network which is controlled by national regulators. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated regulatory policies may induce cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national regulators out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in its series Discussion Papers with number 2005/8.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 30 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2005_008

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Postal: NHH, Department of Finance and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
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Fax: +47 55 95 96 50
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Web page: http://www.nhh.no/for/
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Related research
Keywords: Access regulation Endogenous merger Policy coordination

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  2. Bond, Eric W. & Gresik, Thomas A., 1996. "Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 33-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  4. Gjermund Nese & Odd Rune Staume, 2005. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  5. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Upstream Horizontal Mergers, Bargaining, Vertical Contracts," Economics Working Papers we051507, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Straume, Odd Rune & Sorgard, Lars, 2005. "Downstream merger with upstream market power," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 717-743, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gjermund Nese & Odd Straume, 2007. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  12. Haaparanta, Pertti, 1996. "Competition for foreign direct investments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 141-153, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  15. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2003. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1539-1555, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2001. "Strategic tax competition; implications of national ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 253-277, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Giacomo Calzolari, 2004. "Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 257-282, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Gjermund Nese & Odd Straume, 2007. "Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 31-52, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
    Other versions:
  20. Calzolari, Giacomo, 2001. "The Theory and Practice of Regulation with Multinational Enterprises," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 191-211, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. George Symeonidis, 2007. "Downstream Competition, Bargaining and Welfare," Economics Discussion Papers 625, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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