Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs
AbstractAn individual’s contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naive and biased towards taking things at "face value". We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naive inferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0807.
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
Phone: +44 (0)1227 764000
Fax: +44 (0)1227 827850
Web page: http://www.ukc.ac.uk/economics/
Other versions of this item:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-06-21 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2008-06-21 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-06-21 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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