Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

How category reporting can improve fundraising

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cartwright, Edward
  • Patel, Amrish

Abstract

Many fundraisers report donations using categories such as more than £ 1000, more than £ 10,000, etc. One naturally wonders how we should categorise donations and whether categorising raises more than simple uncategorised reporting. To answer these questions, we employ a signalling game framework in which both the donor's donation and his benefits of being in a higher category are determined endogenously. We find that categorised reporting can always improve fundraising. Both high and low category thresholds can increase donations, with prior beliefs determining which is better. While categorising can lead to the existence of a low donation equilibrium, it is less problematic if signalling benefits are low.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268113000048
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 87 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 73-90

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:87:y:2013:i:c:p:73-90

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords: Category reporting; Esteem; Fundraising; Signalling;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Glazer, Amihai & Konrad, Kai A, 1996. "A Signaling Explanation for Charity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 1019-28, September.
  2. Jeffrey Carpenter & Caitlin Knowles Myers, 2010. "Why Volunteer? Evidence on the Role of Altruism, Image, and Incentives," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 1023, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  3. James Andreoni & Ragan Petrie, 2003. "Public Goods Experiments Without Confidentiality: A Glimpse Into Fund-Raising," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000520, David K. Levine.
  4. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June.
  5. Riley, John G, 1979. "Noncooperative Equilibrium and Market Signalling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 303-07, May.
  6. Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2004. "Incentives and Prosocial Behaviour," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4633, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Arieh Gavious & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2002. "Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 709-722, Winter.
  8. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2011. "Conspicuous generosity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(9-10), pages 1131-1143, October.
  9. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June.
  10. Holger Sieg & Jipeng Zhang, 2012. "The Effectiveness Of Private Benefits In Fundraising Of Local Charities," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 349-374, 05.
  11. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  12. Harbaugh, William T., 1998. "What do donations buy?: A model of philanthropy based on prestige and warm glow," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 269-284, February.
  13. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  14. de Oliveira, Angela C.M. & Croson, Rachel T.A. & Eckel, Catherine, 2011. "The giving type: Identifying donors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(5-6), pages 428-435, June.
  15. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
  16. Dan Ariely & Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, 2009. "Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 544-55, March.
  17. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
  18. John G. Riley, 1976. "Informational Equilibrium," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 071, UCLA Department of Economics.
  19. James Andreoni, 2007. "Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001459, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Drazen, Allan & Limao, Nuno & Stratmann, Thomas, 2007. "Political contribution caps and lobby formation: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 723-754, April.
  21. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2007. "Contests for Status," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 338-363.
  22. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0008, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  23. Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January.
  24. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October.
  25. Rick Harbaugh & Theodore To, 2005. "False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad," Working Papers, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy 2005-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  26. Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2011. "Payment Choice, Image Motivation and Contributions to Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 180-205, February.
  27. Lacetera, Nicola & Macis, Mario, 2010. "Social image concerns and prosocial behavior: Field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 225-237, November.
  28. Harbaugh, William T, 1998. "The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 277-82, May.
  29. Alpizar, Francisco & Carlsson, Fredrik & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2007. "Anonymity, Reciprocity, and Conformity: Evidence from Voluntary Contributions to a National Park in Costa Rica," Working Papers in Economics 245, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  30. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2010. "Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice between Privacy and Publicity," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 191-221, May.
  31. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
  32. Edward Cartwright & Amrish Patel, 2008. "Public Goods, Social Norms and Naive Beliefs," Studies in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Kent 0807, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
  33. Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2010. "Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice," Working Papers, Tulane University, Department of Economics 1006, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
  34. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:87:y:2013:i:c:p:73-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.