This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Social Norms and Naive Beliefs

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Amrish Patel ()
Edward Cartwright ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the effect that naive agents (those who take behaviour at "face value") have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naive inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naive agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.ukc.ac.uk/pub/ejr/RePEc/ukc/ukcedp/0906.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0906.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ukc:ukcedp:0906

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
Phone: +44 (0)1227 764000
Fax: +44 (0)1227 827850
Web page: http://www.ukc.ac.uk/economics/

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Emma Robinson).

Related research
Keywords: Signalling; Conformity; Social Norms; Naive beliefs;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over five million full texts a year are downloaded through IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-11.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.