On the path-dependence of tax compliance
AbstractThis paper presents experimental evidence that tax compliance is path dependent. We show that individuals faced with the same current tax enforcement parameters, will nevertheless choose different compliance if they have faced different tax enforcement parameters in the past. This finding has important policy implications. For instance, legal harmonization in the EU cannot be expected to reliably yield similar behavior in countries with different legal histories.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz in its series TWI Research Paper Series with number 59.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
tax compliance; path dependence; experiment;
Other versions of this item:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2010-12-04 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-12-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-12-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-12-04 (Public Economics)
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