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Reference points, anchors, norms, and mixed feelings

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Kahneman, Daniel

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WP2-4CYG22J-3Y/2/e83c2d58f9e151f2ad31a20aa6af58a2
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.

Volume (Year): 51 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 296-312
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:51:y:1992:i:2:p:296-312

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  1. Zur Shapira & Itzhak Venezia, 2007. "On the Preference for Full-Coverage Policies: Why do People buy too much Insurance?," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001505, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Carlsson, Fredrik & Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Martinsson, Peter, 2002. "Is Transport Safety More Valuable in the Air?," Working Papers in Economics 84, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jonathan Shalev, 1996. "Loss Aversion and Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9606001, EconWPA, revised 18 Mar 1997. [Downloadable!]
  4. Zur Shapira & Itzhak Venezia, 2007. "On the Preference for Full-Coverage Policies: Why do People buy too much Insurance?," Discussion Paper Series dp460, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  5. Gordon B. Dahl & Michael R. Ransom, 1999. "Does Where You Stand Depend on Where You Sit? Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 703-727, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Loss Aversion Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703001, EconWPA, revised 11 Mar 1997. [Downloadable!]
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