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Tax Evasion, Tax Rates, and Reference Dependence

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Author Info
Michele Bernasconi
Alberto Zanardi

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Abstract

Using cumulative prospect theory as a notable example of reference-dependent preference, we revisit the basic portfolio model of tax evasion. We show that some controversial implications of the standard expected-utility theory, including that of a negative relationship between tax rates and evaded income, can be corrected in a direction more consistent with intuition and empirical evidence.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.

Volume (Year): 60 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 422-
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200409)60:3_422:tetrar_2.0.tx_2-w

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Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
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Related research
Keywords: tax evasion; reference income; prospect theory;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

Cited by:
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  1. Luigi Mittone & Michele Bernasconi, 2003. "Income tax evasion and artificial reference points: two experiments," CEEL Working Papers 0305, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.