We use Koszegi and Rabin's (2006) model of reference-dependent utility, and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences, to study preferences over monetary risk. Because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes, it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest-scale risk. It replicates "classical" prospect theory—including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses—when exposure to risk is a surprise, but implies first-order risk aversion when a risk, and the possibility of insuring it, are anticipated. A prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk. For large-scale risk, the model allows for standard "consumption utility" to dominate reference-dependent "gain-loss utility," generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations. (JEL D81)
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Volume (Year): 97 (2007) Issue (Month): 4 (September) Pages: 1047-1073 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Lorenz Goette & David Huffman, 2009.
"Reference Points and Effort Provision,"
Discussion Papers
2009-02, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
[Downloadable!]
Eriksen, Kristoffer W. & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2008.
"Tournaments with prize-setting agents,"
Discussion Papers
2008/23, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Di Tella, Rafael & Dubra, Juan, 2008.
"Anger and Regulation,"
MPRA Paper
14442, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 29 Mar 2009.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Rafael Di Tella & Juan Dubra, 2009.
"Anger and Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
15201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)