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Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance

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Author Info
Alm, James
Jackson, Betty
McKee, Michael

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 82 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 1018-26
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:82:y:1992:i:4:p:1018-26

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  1. Murphy, James & Stranlund, John, 2003. "An Experimental Analysis Of Compliance Behavior In Emissions Trading Programs: Some Preliminary Results," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22039, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2007. "Tax Evasion, Tax Amnesties and the Psychological Tax Contract," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0729, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard Cebula, 2003. "Tax evasion as ade facto vote of disapproval of PAC contributions," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 31(4), pages 338-347, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ronald G. Cummings & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Michael McKee, 2001. "Cross Cultural Comparisions of Tax Compliance Behavior," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0103, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Compliance and Leverage in Auditing and Regulatory Enforcement," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 918, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Werner Güth & Sabine Strauß & Matthias Sutter, 2002. "Tax evasion and state productivity – An experimental study," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. C. Cadsby & Elizabeth Maynes & Viswanath Trivedi, 2006. "Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 343-359, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp287, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Benno Torgler & Markus Schaffner, 2007. "Causes and Consequences of Tax Morale: An Empirical Investigation," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 222, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Benno Torgler, 2003. "Beyond Punishment: a tax compliance experiment with taxpayers in Costa Rica," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Ilades-Georgetown University, Economics Department, vol. 18(1), pages 27-56, June. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ralph C Bayer & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "The excess burden of tax evasion - An experimental detection- concealment contest," Experimental 0412003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Jordi Caballé & Judith Panadés, 2005. "Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 239-263, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Richard M Bird & Joosung Jun, 2005. "Earmarking in Theory and Korean Practice," International Tax Program Papers 0513, International Tax Program, Institute for International Business, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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