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Tax compliance as a coordination game

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Author Info
Alm, James
McKee, Michael

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 54 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 297-312
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:54:y:2004:i:3:p:297-312

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  1. Gerald Pech & Bernhard Neumaerker, 2002. "The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0213, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority," ESE Discussion Papers 149, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  3. Oliver Kirchkamp & Michele Bernasconi & Paolo Paruolo, 2006. "Do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations? Experiments with real world and lab data," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0608, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Ronald G. Cummings & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Michael McKee, 2001. "Cross Cultural Comparisions of Tax Compliance Behavior," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0103, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lipatov, Vilen, 2006. "Tax Evasion and Coordination," MPRA Paper 1251, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2006. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-9-3.


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