Tax compliance as a coordination game
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 54 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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- Alm, James & McKee, Michael J. & Beck, William, 1990. "Amazing Grace: Tax Amnesties and Compliance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 43(1), pages 23-37, March.
- Greenberg, Joseph, 1984. "Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-13, February.
- Landsberger, Michael & Meilijson, Isaac, 1982. "Incentive generating state dependent penalty system : The case of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 333-352, December.
- Alm, James & Cronshaw, Mark B & McKee, Michael, 1993. "Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 27-45.
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- J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil, 2010. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000393, David K. Levine.
- Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Rankin, Frederick W, 1997. "On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 576-96, May.
- Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March.
- Rickard, J A & Russell, A M & Howroyd, T D, 1982. "A Tax Evasion Model with Allowance for Retroactive Penalties," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 58(163), pages 379-85, December.
- Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June.
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- Alm, James & Jackson, Betty & McKee, Michael, 1992. "Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1018-26, September.
- Martin Sefton, 1999. "A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 151-164, December.
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