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Expressive Law and Economics

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Author Info
Robert Cooter ()
Abstract

This article develops an economic theory of expressive law. By expressing social values, law can tip a system of social norms into a new equilibrium. This process can create or destroy a social norm without changing individual values. In addition, law can change the individual values of rational people. Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment conveys an advantage relative to the original references and the changed preferences. I call such a commitment a Pareto self-improvement. By creating opportunities for Pareto self-improvements, law induces rational people to change their preferences. Inducing change in this way respects individual preferences, rather favoring a particular moral theory.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 161.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_161

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  1. Bohnet, Iris & Cooter, Robert, 2003. "Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?," Working Paper Series rwp03-046, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
  2. Denton Marks, 2002. "Academic Standards as Public Goods and Varieties of Free-Rider Behaviour," Education Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 145-163, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joël van der Weele, 2009. "Can Sanctions Induce Pessimism? An Experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 024, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Iris Bohnet & Robert Cooter, 2001. "Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1058, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Galbiati, Roberto & Vertova, Pietro, 2005. "Law and behaviours in social dilemmas: testing the effect of obligations on cooperation," Discussion Paper 56, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  7. John Lewis, 2007. "Hitting and Hoping? Meeting the Exchange Rate and Inflation Criteria During a Period of Nominal Convergence," DNB Working Papers 130, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Iris Bohnet & Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, . "More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding," IEW - Working Papers iewwp052, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  9. Richard McAdams & Janice Nadler, . "A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1029, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  10. Paul T. de Beer & Robert H.J. Mosch, 2007. "The waning and restoration of social norms: a formal model of the dynamics of norm compliance and norm violation," DNB Working Papers 131, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  11. Robert Cooter, 1999. "Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1047, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Robert Cooter, 2000. "Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalizing Legal Values," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1050, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Nuno Garoupa, 2003. "Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 5-15, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Guido Tabellini, 2008. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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