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Expectations Formation and Forecasting of Vehicle Demand: An Empirical Study of the Vehicle Quota Auctions in Singapore

Author

Listed:
  • Sing-Fat Chu

    (National University of Singapore)

  • Winston T.H. Koh

    (School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University)

  • Yiu Kuen Tse

    (School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University)

Abstract

This paper studies the expectations formation and forecasting of vehicle demand in Singapore under the vehicle quota system. Under the system, a car buyer must first bid for a vehicle license in monthly auctions in order to purchase a new car. We construct an econometric model to test the hypothesis that past bid distributions of the license auctions contain information that car buyers can use to update their expectations about the intensity of market demand, forecast the license premiums and formulate their bidding strategies in future auctions. Our empirical analysis indicates that past bid distributions have a good degree of predictive power for the license premiums.

Suggested Citation

  • Sing-Fat Chu & Winston T.H. Koh & Yiu Kuen Tse, 2003. "Expectations Formation and Forecasting of Vehicle Demand: An Empirical Study of the Vehicle Quota Auctions in Singapore," Working Papers 02-2004, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:siu:wpaper:02-2004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Hendricks & Harry J. Paarsch, 1995. "A Survey of Recent Empirical Work Concerning Auctions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 403-426, May.
    2. Koh, Winston T. H., 2003. "Control of vehicle ownership and market competition: theory and Singapore's experience with the vehicle quota system," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 749-770, November.
    3. Phang, Sock-Yong, 1993. "Singapore's motor vehicle policy: Review of recent changes and a suggested alternative," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 329-336, July.
    4. Ling Hui Tan, 2003. "Rationing Rules and Outcomes: The Experience of Singapore's Vehicle Quota System," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 50(3), pages 1-5.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    7. Singfat, Chu-Chun-Lin, 1998. "Bidding Efficiencies for Rights to Car Ownership in Singapore," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 297-306, April.
    8. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1986. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 894-920, December.
    9. Chu, Singfat, 2002. "Auctioning rights to vehicle ownership: Singapore's experience with sealed-bid tenders," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 555-561, July.
    10. Levin, Dan & Kagel, John H & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1996. "Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 442-460, June.
    11. Chin, Anthony & Smith, Peter, 1997. "Automobile ownership and government policy: The economics of Singapore's vehicle quota scheme," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 129-140, March.
    12. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Junji Xiao & Xiaolan Zhou & Wei‐Min Hu, 2017. "Welfare Analysis Of The Vehicle Quota System In China," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 617-650, May.
    2. Chu, Singfat, 2015. "Car restraint policies and mileage in Singapore," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 404-412.
    3. Singfat Chu, 2011. "Sealed v/s open bids for certificates of entitlement under the vehicle quota system in Singapore," Transportation, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 215-226, March.
    4. Li, Zhi-Chun & Wu, Qiao-Yu & Yang, Hai, 2019. "A theory of auto ownership rationing," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 125-146.
    5. Song, Siqi & Diao, Mi & Feng, Chen-Chieh, 2021. "Effects of pricing and infrastructure on car ownership: A pseudo-panel-based dynamic model," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 115-126.
    6. Yu, De-Ping & Li, Zhi-Chun, 2023. "Income distribution, implementation sequence, and equity in auto ownership rationing," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 59-89.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    quota licenses; vehicle demand; learning; expectations formation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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