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Inflation Targeting, Committee Decision Making and Uncertainty: The case of the Bank of England's MPC

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  • Sean Holly
  • Arnab Bhattacharjee

Abstract

Policymaking at the Bank of England has provided detailed information on both the decisions of individual members of the Monetary Policy Committee. We consider this decision making process in the context of a model in which inflation forecast targeting is used but there is heterogeneity among the members of the committee. We find that forecasts of output and inflation provide the best description of discrete changes in interest rates. We find a role for asset prices through the equity market, foreign exchange market and housing prices. There is also identifiable heterogeneity among members of the committee that improves predictabilit

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 with number 119.

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Date of creation: 11 Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf5:119

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Keywords: Monetary policy; interest rates; Monetary Policy Committee; Committee decision making.;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Brooks, Robert & Harris, Mark & Spencer, Christopher, 2007. "An Inflated Ordered Probit Model of Monetary Policy: Evidence from MPC Voting Data," MPRA Paper 8509, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Stephen Hansen & Michael F. McMahon, 2008. "Delayed Doves: MPC Voting Behaviour of Externals," CEP Discussion Papers dp0862, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  3. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2010. "What Do Outside Experts Bring To A Committee? Evidence From The Bank of England," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 946, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  4. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2011. "How Experts Decide : Identifying Preferences versus Signals from Policy Decisions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 963, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Carlos Velasco Rivera, 2013. "How Expoerts Decide: Preferences or Private Assessments on a Monetary Policy Committee?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4201, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
  7. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2006. "Taking Personalities out of Monetary Policy Decision Making? Interactions, Heterogeneity and Committee Decisions in the Bank of England’s MPC," CDMA Working Paper Series 200612, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
  8. Roman Horvath & Katerina Smidkova & Jan Zapal, 2010. "Central Banks' Voting Records and Future Policy," Working Papers 2010/11, Czech National Bank, Research Department.

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