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Decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members

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  • Harris, Mark
  • Spencer, Christopher

Abstract

We examine the dissent voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in its first decade. Probit estimates indicate the impact of career experience on dissent voting is negligible, whereas the impact of forecast inflation is pronounced. In addition to finding a role for dynamics, we also find a role for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of member-specific fixed-effects, suggesting previous literature characterizing voting behavior as largely determined by whether members are appointed from within or outside the ranks of Bank of England staff (internal and external members respectively) is overly simplistic.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9100.

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Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9100

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Keywords: Bank of England; Monetary Policy Committee; career background effects; dissent voting; unobserved heterogeneity;

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