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Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees

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  • Alessandro Riboni

    (Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal)

  • Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia

    (Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal)

Abstract

This short paper employs individual voting records of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England to study heterogeneity in policy preferences among committee members. The analysis is carried out using a simple generalization of the standard New Keynesian framework that allows members to differ in the weight they give to output compared with inflation stabilization and in their views regarding optimal inflation and natural output. Results indicate that, qualitatively, MPC members are fairly homogeneous in their policy preferences, but there are systematic quantitative differences in their policy reaction functions that are related to the nature of their membership and career background.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by International Journal of Central Banking in its journal International Journal of Central Banking.

Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 213-233

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Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2008:q:1:a:6

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  1. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November.
  2. RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2007. "Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees," Cahiers de recherche 2007-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  3. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, 1997. "An Optimizing IS-LM Specification for Monetary Policy and Business Cycle Analysis," NBER Working Papers 5875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," NBER Working Papers 5893, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  6. Daniel Seidmann, 2006. "A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees," Discussion Papers 2006-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  7. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 1997. "Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory," Economics Working Papers 350, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 1999.
  8. Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 861-886, October.
  9. Daniel Seidmann, 2011. "A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 49-74, January.
  10. Tootell, Geoffrey M. B., 1999. "Whose monetary policy is it anyway?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 217-235, February.
  11. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-12.
  12. Christopher Spencer, 2006. "The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Members," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0306, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  13. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2009. "Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(6), pages 1099-1115, 09.
  14. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1991. "The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(1), pages 130-38, February.
  15. Daniel Seidmann, 2006. "A Theory of Voting Patterns and Performance in Private and Public Committees," Discussion Papers 2006-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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