IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/baf/cbafwp/cbafwp21153.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)

Author

Listed:
  • Donato Masciandaro

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to shed light on how two factors "central bank's design and central bankers' preferences" progressively assumed a crucial role in the evolution of monetary policy economics in the last four decades. The two factors jointly identify the importance of central bank governance in influencing monetary policy decisions through their interactions with the monetary policy rules, given the assumptions about how macroeconomic systems work.

Suggested Citation

  • Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp21153
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.unibocconi.it/baffic/baf/papers/cbafwp21153.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ozlale, Umit, 2003. "Price stability vs. output stability: tales of federal reserve administrations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 1595-1610, July.
    2. Timothy Besley & Neil Meads & Paolo Surico, 2008. "Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 218-223, May.
    3. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2008. "Delayed doves: MPC voting behaviour of externals," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19611, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    5. Berggren, Niclas & Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Hellström, Jörgen, 2014. "Social trust and central-bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 425-439.
    6. George S. Tavlas, 2015. "In Old Chicago: Simons, Friedman, and the Development of Monetary‐Policy Rules," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 99-121, February.
    7. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    8. Klodiana Istrefi, 2019. "In Fed Watchers’ Eyes: Hawks, Doves and Monetary Policy," Working papers 725, Banque de France.
    9. Molnár, Krisztina & Santoro, Sergio, 2014. "Optimal monetary policy when agents are learning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 39-62.
    10. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Jensen, Henrik, 1998. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 384-403, August.
    11. Gohlmann, Silja & Vaubel, Roland, 2007. "The educational and occupational background of central bankers and its effect on inflation: An empirical analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 925-941, May.
    12. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
    13. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-286, March.
    14. Guillermo Vuletin & Ling Zhu, 2011. "Replacing a “Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(6), pages 1185-1215, September.
    15. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    16. Berggren, Niclas & Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Hellstrã–M, Jã–Rgen, 2016. "Does social trust speed up reforms? The case of central-bank independence," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 395-415, June.
    17. Bernhard, William, 1998. "A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 311-327, June.
    18. Bennett T. McCallum, 1987. "The case for rules in the conduct of monetary policy: a concrete example," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 73(Sep), pages 10-18.
    19. de Haan, Jakob & Berger, Helge & van Fraassen, Erik, 2001. "How to reduce inflation: an independent central bank or a currency board? The experience of the Baltic countries," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 218-243, September.
    20. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    21. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, February.
    22. Malmendier, Ulrike & Nagel, Stefan & Yan, Zhen, 2021. "The making of hawks and doves," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 19-42.
    23. Jorg Bibow, 2010. "A Post Keynesian Perspective on the Rise of Central Bank Independence: A Dubious Success Story in Monetary Economics," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_625, Levy Economics Institute.
    24. Keiichi Morimoto, 2018. "Further Results on Preference Uncertainty and Monetary Conservatism," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 583-592.
    25. Henckel, Timo & Menzies, Gordon D. & Prokhovnik, Nick & Zizzo, Daniel J., 2011. "Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 144-147, August.
    26. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    27. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
    28. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
    29. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2003. "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(3), pages 407-423, August.
    30. Masciandaro, Donato & Volpicella, Alessio, 2016. "Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 101-119.
    31. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Pablo Querubin & James A. Robinson, 2008. "When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 351-429.
    32. repec:ces:ifodic:v:15:y:2017:i:1:p:19307482 is not listed on IDEAS
    33. Pierre L. Siklos & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2015. "How Monetary Policy Is Made: Two Canadian Tales," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(1), pages 225-250, January.
    34. Consolo, Agostino & Favero, Carlo A., 2009. "Monetary policy inertia: More a fiction than a fact?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 900-906, September.
    35. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2010. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance, or Simple Majority?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 363-416.
    36. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2010. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(4), pages 647-677, June.
    37. Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Di Pietro, Marco & Giannini, Bianca, 2016. "Optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 373-387.
    38. Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek & Stéphane Vigeant, 2014. "On the Performance of Monetary Policy Committees," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 177-203, May.
    39. Ueda, Kenichi & Valencia, Fabián, 2014. "Central bank independence and macro-prudential regulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 327-330.
    40. repec:cii:cepiei:2015-q1-141-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    41. Tom Lähner, 2018. "Inconsistent voting behaviour in the FOMC," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(14), pages 1617-1643, March.
    42. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1995. "The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(433), pages 1381-1402, November.
    43. Cristina Bodea, 2014. "Fixed exchange rates, independent central banks and price stability in postcommunist countries: Conservatism and credibility," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 185-211, July.
    44. Bagheri, Fatholla M & Habibi, Nader, 1998. "Political Institutions and Central Bank Independence: A Cross-Country Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 187-204, July.
    45. Xavier Gabaix, 2020. "A Behavioral New Keynesian Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(8), pages 2271-2327, August.
    46. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Hoeberichts, Macro M., 2008. "The trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism in a New Keynesian framework," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 742-747, December.
    47. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-677, August.
    48. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2010. "Rational Partisan Theory, Uncertainty, And Spatial Voting: Evidence For The Bank Of England'S Mpc," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 151-179, July.
    49. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    50. Alan Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2017. "Monetary Policy after the Crisis," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 15(1), pages 12-13, 04.
    51. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
    52. Henry W. Chappell & Thomas M. Havrilesky & Rob Roy McGregor, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218.
    53. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2016. "Fiscal Implications of Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 11383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    54. Alan Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2017. "Monetary Policy after the Crisis," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 15(01), pages 12-13, April.
    55. Erlend Nier, 2009. "Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons From the Crisis," IMF Working Papers 2009/070, International Monetary Fund.
    56. Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March.
    57. Petra Gerlach‐Kristen, 2009. "Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(6), pages 1099-1115, September.
    58. Alan Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2017. "Necessity as the mother of invention: monetary policy after the crisis," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(92), pages 707-755.
    59. Hamza Bennani, 2015. "Dissecting the brains of central bankers: The case of the ECB’s Governing Council members on reforms," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 141, pages 97-114.
    60. Brumm, Harold J., 2011. "Inflation and central bank independence: Two-way causality?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 220-222, June.
    61. Derakhshani Darabi , Kaveh & Jafari Samimi , Ahmad, 2016. "Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Conservatism: Theory with an Application to Iran," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 11(1), pages 15-30, January.
    62. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May.
    63. Alexander Jung & Gergely Kiss, 2012. "Voting by monetary policy committees: evidence from the CEE inflation-targeting countries," MNB Working Papers 2012/2, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
    64. Bodea, Cristina & Hicks, Raymond, 2015. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 35-61, January.
    65. Dal Bo, Ernesto, 2006. "Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 573-599, May.
    66. Sorge, Marco M., 2013. "Robust delegation with uncertain monetary policy preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 73-78.
    67. Forder, James, 1998. "Central Bank Independence--Conceptual Clarifications and Interim Assessment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 307-334, July.
    68. John B. Taylor, 2013. "The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence Versus Policy Rules," Discussion Papers 12-009, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    69. Farvaque, Etienne, 2002. "Political determinants of central bank independence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 131-135, September.
    70. Muscatelli, Anton, 1998. "Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability through Independence?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 529-542, March.
    71. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    72. Seth Carpenter & Jane Ihrig & Elizabeth Klee & Daniel Quinn & Alexander Boote, 2015. "The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet and Earnings: A Primer and Projections," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(2), pages 237-283, March.
    73. Massaro, Domenico, 2013. "Heterogeneous expectations in monetary DSGE models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 680-692.
    74. Marco Bassetto & Todd Messer, 2013. "Fiscal Consequences of Paying Interest on Reserves," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 34, pages 413-436, December.
    75. Cukierman, Alex, 1994. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1437-1448, November.
    76. Cukierman, Alex, 2013. "Monetary policy and institutions before, during, and after the global financial crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 373-384.
    77. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7683 is not listed on IDEAS
    78. Howitt, Peter, 2012. "What have central bankers learned from modern macroeconomic theory?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 11-22.
    79. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
    80. Jörg Bibow, 2002. "Keynes on Central Banking and the Structure of Monetary Policy," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 749-787, Winter.
    81. repec:cii:cepiie:2015-q1-141-60 is not listed on IDEAS
    82. John B Taylor, 2013. "The Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence vs. Policy Rules," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162, July.
    83. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1998. "Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 45(1), pages 33-47, February.
    84. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael & Velasco Rivera, Carlos, 2014. "Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 16-32.
    85. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    7. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1871, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Donato Masciandaro, 2019. "Populism, Economic Policies, Political Pressure And Central Bank (In)Dependence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19111, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    9. Donato Masciandaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2018. "Populism, Financial Inequality And Central Bank Independence: A Political Economics Approach," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1874, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    10. Federico Faveretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Financial Inequality, group entitlements and populism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1892, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Donato Masciandaro, 2020. "Covid-19 Helicopter Money, Monetary Policy And Central Bank Independence: Economics And Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20137, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    12. Jamus Jerome Lim, 2021. "The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 309-335, March.
    13. Favaretto, Federico & Masciandaro, Donato, 2016. "Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 50-58.
    14. Donato Masciandaro, 2020. "Ecb Helicopter Money: Economic And Political Economy Arithmetics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20138, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    15. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    16. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2016. "Gender and Monetary Policymaking: Trends and Drivers," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1512, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    17. Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Central Banks And Macroprudential Policies: Economics And Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1878, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    18. de Haan, J. & Eijffinger, Sylvester, 2016. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence," Other publications TiSEM 54f2c3e3-46f2-4763-b1ac-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Alesina, Alberto & Stella, Andrea, 2010. "The Politics of Monetary Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 18, pages 1001-1054, Elsevier.
    20. Donato Masciandaro & Paola Profeta & Davide Romelli, 2023. "Women and Governance: Central Bank Boards and Monetary Policy," Trinity Economics Papers tep1123, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary policy; central bank independence; central banker conservatism; monetary policy committees; political economics; behavioural economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp21153. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michela Pozzi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cbbocit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.