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Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia

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  • Favaretto, Federico
  • Masciandaro, Donato

Abstract

Behavioral bias – loss aversion – can explain monetary policy inertia in setting interest rates. Economic literature has tended to explain inertia in monetary policymaking in terms of frictions and delays, or has stressed the role of governance rules. We introduce a new driver of inertia, independent from frictions and central bank governance settings. While the degree of conservatism doesn’t necessarily produce monetary inertia, we show that introducing loss aversion in individual behavior influences the stance of monetary policy under three different but convergent perspectives. First of all, a Moderation Effect can emerge, i.e. the number of pigeons increases. At the same time also a Hysteresis Effect can become relevant, whereby both doves and hawks soften their attitudes. Finally a Smoothing Effect tends to stabilize the number of pigeons. Together, the three effects consistently cause higher monetary policy inertia.

Suggested Citation

  • Favaretto, Federico & Masciandaro, Donato, 2016. "Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 50-58.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:27:y:2016:i:c:p:50-58
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2016.09.002
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    2. Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "Politicians, Trust and Financial Literacy: When Do Politicians Care?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23206, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    4. Emanuele Borgonovo & Stefano Caselli & Alessandra Cillo & Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Between Cash, Deposit And Bitcoin: Would We Like A Central Bank Digital Currency? Money Demand And Experimental Economics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1875, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    5. Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "Politicians, Trust, Financial Literacy and Financial Education: When Do Politicians Care?," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23208, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Donato Masciandaro & Romano Vincenzo Tarsia, 2021. "Society, Politicians, Climate Change and Central Banks: An Index of Green Activism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21167, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    7. Donato Masciandaro, 2020. "Covid-19 Helicopter Money, Monetary Policy And Central Bank Independence: Economics And Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20137, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    8. Donato Masciandaro, 2020. "Ecb Helicopter Money: Economic And Political Economy Arithmetics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20138, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    9. Mota, Paulo R. & Fernandes, Abel L.C., 2022. "Is the ECB already following albeit implicitly an average inflation targeting strategy?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 149-162.
    10. Stephane Dupraz & Sophie Guilloux-Nefussi & Adrian Penalver, 2023. "A Pitfall of Cautiousness in Monetary Policy∗," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 19(3), pages 269-323, August.
    11. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    12. Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "How Elastic and Predictable Money Should Be: Flexible Monetary Policy Rules from the Great Moderation to the New Normal Times (1993-2023)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23196, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    13. Mr. Ashraf Khan, 2018. "A Behavioral Approach to Financial Supervision, Regulation, and Central Banking," IMF Working Papers 2018/178, International Monetary Fund.
    14. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    15. Carolina Guerini & Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "Financial Education between Market and State: Private Commitment, Conflicts of Interest and Public Certification," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23213, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    16. Emanuele Borgonovo & Stefano Caselli & Alessandra Cillo & Donato Masciandaro, 2017. "Beyond Bitcoin And Cash: Do We Like A Central Bank Digital Currency? A Financial And Political Economics Approach," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1765, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    17. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    18. Donato Masciandaro & Romano Vincenzo Tarsia, 2021. "Society, Politicians, Climate Change and Central Banks: An Index of Green Activism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21167, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    19. Paulo R. Mota & Abel L. C. Fernandes, 2019. "The Dynamic Adjustment Of Central Banks’ Target Interest Rate: The Case Of The Ecb," FEP Working Papers 613, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy inertia; Central banking; Behavioral economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E03 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Macroeconomics

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