Politicians, central banks, and the shape of financial supervision architectures
AbstractPurpose – This paper aims to investigate the role of the quality of government on financial supervisory structures in different countries. Design/methodology/approach – The objectives are pursued by means of econometric tools based on probit and multinomial logit techniques. Findings – It is found that the quality of government plays a crucial role in determining supervision unification. “Good” policymakers (helping hand types) prefer a unified financial authority while “bad” ones (grabbing hand type) choose specialized or hybrid models depending on how powerful is the central bank. Research limitations/implications – Research limitations are represented by the endogenous nature of political variables with respect to the supervisory design. Suggestions for future research rely on finding adequate instrumental variables to be included in the empirical analysis in order to address causality issues. Practical implications – The paper follows a positive approach, explaining why different supervisory structures are observed around the world. As a consequence, it does not provide any normative implication. Originality/value – Its original contribution can be identified in the first attempt to include political preferences in determining the choice among different regimes of financial supervision.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Emerald Group Publishing in its journal Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance.
Volume (Year): 16 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.emeraldinsight.com
Postal: Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK
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- Ovidiu Stoica & Delia-Elena Diaconasu, 2012. "Regional Economic Integration And National Financial Supervision. A Comparative Study," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 2(14), pages 23.
- Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2008. "Institutions Matter: Financial Supervision Architecture, Central Bank and Path Dependence. General Trends and the South Eastern European Countries," Working Papers 89, Bank of Greece.
- Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.
- Marc Quintyn & Donato Masciandaro & MarÃa Nieto, 2009. "Will they Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 09/142, International Monetary Fund.
- Richard Brophy, 2012. "Development of insurance regulation in Ireland," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 20(3), pages 248-263, July.
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