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Institutions Matter: Financial Supervision Architecture, Central Bank and Path Dependence. General Trends and the South Eastern European Countries

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Author Info
Donato Masciandaro () (Paolo Baffi Centre, Bocconi University)
Marc Quintyn (IMF Institute, International Monetary Fund)

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Abstract

We propose a path dependence approach to analyze the evolution of the financial supervisory architecture, focusing on the institutional role of the central bank, and then apply our framework to describe the institutional settings in a selected sample of countries. The policymaker who decides to maintain or reform the supervisory architecture is influenced by the existing institutional setting in a systematic way: the more the central bank is actually involved in supervision, the less likely a more concentrated supervisory regime will emerge, and vice versa (path dependence effect). We test the path dependence effect describing and evaluating the evolution and the present state of the architecture of six national supervisory regimes in South Eastern Europe (SEE): Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. The study of the SEE countries confirms the postulated role of the central bank in the institutional setting. In five cases the high involvement of the central bank in supervision is correlated with a multi–authority regime, while in one case a high degree of financial supervision unification is related with low central bank involvement.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bank of Greece in its series Working Papers with number 89.

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Length: 62 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:bog:wpaper:89

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Related research
Keywords: Financial Supervision; Central Banks; Path Dependence; Political Economy; South Eastern Europe.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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  1. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro, 2008. "Politicians, central banks, and the shape of financial supervision architectures," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 4(4), pages 290-317, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Taylor, Michael & Fleming, Alex, 1999. "Integrated financial supervision : lessons of Northern European experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2223, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alicia García Herrero & Pedro del Río López, 2003. "Implications of the design of monetary policy for financial stability," Macroeconomics 0304008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc, 2008. "Helping hand or grabbing hand?: Politicians, supervision regime, financial structure and market view," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 153-173, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Donato Masciandaro, 2006. "E Pluribus Unum? Authorities' Design in Financial Supervision: Trends and Determinants," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 73-102, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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