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Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Gambini
  • Mr. Salim M. Darbar
  • Mr. Marco Arnone

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between the quality of banking supervision and governance of the supervisory agency, based on assessments of the Basel Core Principles and the IMF Code on Transparency in Financial Policies, covering 116 and 53 countries, respectively, with 51 common to both. We find a positive correlation between the transparency of the supervisor and the effectiveness of banking supervision; moreover, better accountability and integrity practices of the banking supervisors are associated with higher independence, which in turn is associated with better compliance with the Basel Core Principles. These results are largely robust to different stages of financial development.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Gambini & Mr. Salim M. Darbar & Mr. Marco Arnone, 2007. "Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance," IMF Working Papers 2007/082, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2007/082
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2010. "Institutions Matter: Financial Supervision Architecture, Central Bank and Path-Dependence. General Trends and the South Eastern European Countries," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 8(1), pages 7-53.
    2. Franka Liedorp & Robert Mosch & Carin van der Cruijsen & Jakob de Haan, 2013. "Transparency of Banking Supervisors," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 61(2), pages 310-335, June.
    3. Pratt, Richard & Berg, Alexander, 2014. "Governance of securities regulators : a framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6800, The World Bank.
    4. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen & Petra Geraats, 2022. "Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency: Further Updates," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 18(1), pages 331-348, March.
    5. Masciandaro, D. & Nieto, M. & Prast, H.M., 2007. "Financial Governance of Banking Supervision," Other publications TiSEM 65d7ff26-dca3-4da3-86ff-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2010. "Guidance for the Establishment of a Legal Protection Scheme for Deposit Insurance Systems," IADI Guidance Papers 10-02, International Association of Deposit Insurers.
    7. Houssem Rachdi, 2010. "The Link between International Supervision and Banking Crises," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 57(3), pages 321-332, September.
    8. Melecky, Martin & Podpiera, Anca Maria, 2012. "Institutional structures of financial sector supervision, their drivers and emerging benchmark models," MPRA Paper 37059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Marco Arnone & Pier Padoan, 2008. "Anti-money laundering by international institutions: a preliminary assessment," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 361-386, December.
    10. Paul Cavelaars & Jakob de Haan & Paul Hilbers & Bart Stellinga, 2013. "Challenges for financial sector supervision," DNB Occasional Studies 1106, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    11. Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Ms. Rosaria Vega Pansini & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "The Economic Crisis: Did Financial Supervision Matter?," IMF Working Papers 2011/261, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    13. Donato Masciandaro & Maria J. Nieto & Marc Quintyn, 2011. "Will They Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Melecky, Martin & Podpiera, Anca Maria, 2013. "Institutional structures of financial sector supervision, their drivers and historical benchmarks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 428-444.
    15. Ms. Concha Verdugo Yepes, 2011. "Compliance with the AM+L4776L/CFT International Standard: Lessons from a Cross-Country Analysis," IMF Working Papers 2011/177, International Monetary Fund.

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