Barro-Gordon revisited: Reputational equilibria with inferential expectations
AbstractWe incorporate inferential expectations into the Barro-Gordon model (Barro and Gordon, 1983a) of time inconsistency and consider reputational equilibria. The range of sustainable equilibria shrinks as the private sector becomes more belief-conservative.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 112 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Credibility Time inconsistency Reputation Inferential expectations;
Other versions of this item:
- Timo Henckel & Gordon Menzies & Nicholas Prokhovnik & Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Barro-Gordon Revisited: Reputational Equilibria with Inferential Expectations," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 018, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Timo Henckel & Gordon D. Menzies & Nick Prokhovnik & Daniel J. Zizzo, 2010. "Barro-Gordon Revisited: Reputational Equilibria with Inferential Expectations," CAMA Working Papers 2010-29, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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