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Managers and wage policies

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of individual top managers on wages and wage policies. A large longitudinal administrative dataset from Portugal allows us to match workers,firms and top managers, and follow the movements of the latter across different firms over time. We estimate the role of top manager fixed-effects in determining wages and wage policies, while also accounting for the effect of worker and firm heterogeneity. Our results reveal that top managers have a significant influence on wages, the returns to schooling and tenure, the gender wage gap, and the extent of rent sharing. Further-more, they point to the existence of managerial styles in the setting of wage policies. Finally, we relate worker compensation to observable managerial attributes, and find that returns to schooling tend to be higher in firms led by more educated top executives, while longer-tenured managers appear on average to engage in more rent sharing.

Suggested Citation

  • Natália P. Monteiro & Paulo Bastos, 2009. "Managers and wage policies," NIPE Working Papers 2/2009, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    • Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:2/2009
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Top managers; wage policies; linked worker-firm-manager data.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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