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Discrimination and Workers' Expectations

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  • Filippin, Antonio

    ()
    (University of Milan)

Abstract

The paper explores the role of workers’ expectations as an original explanation for the puzzling long run persistence of observed discrimination against some minorities in the labor market. A game of incomplete information is presented, showing that ex ante identical groups of workers may be characterized by unequal outcomes in equilibrium due to their different beliefs, even though discriminatory tastes and statistical discrimination by employers have disappeared. Wrong beliefs of being discriminated against are self-confirming in this circumstance, being the ultimate cause of a lower percentage of promotions which supports these wrong beliefs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 823.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp823

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Related research

Keywords: discrimination; workers’ expectations; self-confirming beliefs;

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References

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  1. Andrew Schotter & Allan Corns, 1999. "Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preference Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 291-305, March.
  2. Richard Breen & Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, 2002. "Bayesian Learning and Gender Segregation," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 899-922, October.
  3. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  4. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2001. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1926, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Filippin, Antonio & Ichino, Andrea, 2005. "Gender wage gap in expectations and realizations," Labour Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 125-145, February.
  7. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  8. Filippin, Antonio, 2003. "Discrimination and Workers' Expectations: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 824, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-45, May.
  10. Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1992. "Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 511-39, May.
  11. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
  12. Mincer, Jacob & Polachek, Solomon, 1974. "Family Investment in Human Capital: Earnings of Women," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S76-S108, Part II, .
  13. Moro, Andrea & Norman, Peter, 2004. "A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 1-30, January.
  14. Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, 1977. "Statistical theories of discrimination in labor markets," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(2), pages 175-187, January.
  15. Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polacheck, 1974. "Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children, and Human Capital, pages 397-431 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Phelps, Edmund S, 1972. "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 659-61, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Filippin, Antonio & Guala, Francesco, 2011. "Costless Discrimination and Unequal Achievements in a Labour Market Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 6187, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Filippin, Antonio & Ichino, Andrea, 2005. "Gender wage gap in expectations and realizations," Labour Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 125-145, February.
  3. Antonio Filippin, 2003. "Discrimination and workers' expectations: experimental evidence," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano 2003-16, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  4. Antonio Filippin & Francesco Guala, 2013. "Costless discrimination and unequal achievements in an experimental tournament," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 285-305, September.

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