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Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Emrah Arbak () (CNRS-GATE, University of Lyon)
Marie-Claire Villeval () (CNRS-GATE, University of Lyon, and IZA)
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In social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, especially if the followers are not adequately motivated to make similar sacrifices. Attempting to understand what motivates these seemingly selfless individuals to lead, we report the results of a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous timing. Even though it turns out to be costly on average, a large proportion of our subjects volunteer to lead. Our findings suggest that a fraction of these leaders are socially concerned, while others expect to distill some personal gain, possibly of non-pecuniary nature. The composition of the team also matters, as publicizing certain attributes of a subject’s teammates has an impact on her decision to lead. Lastly, though voluntary leaders improve efficiency in their team, they are not necessarily more influential than randomly imposed leaders.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007Date of revision:
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Keywords: leadership ; endogenous selection ; influence ; voluntary contribution ; experiment ; Other versions of this item:
Paper Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007.
"Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence ,"
Working Papers
0707, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
[Downloadable!] Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007.
"Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence ,"
Post-Print
halshs-00175064_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!] Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007.
"Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence ,"
Post-Print
halshs-00142461_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!] Find related papers by JEL classification: M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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Gary Charness & MARIE-CLAIRE VILLEVAL, 2008.
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