Sequential Provision of Public Goods

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Sequential Provision of Public Goods

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Hal R. Varian (University of Michigan, Dept of Economics)

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Hal Varian

Abstract

I consider the private provision of public goods in two stage games. If the agent who likes the public good least contributes first, the amount of the public good supplied will be the same as in the Nash equilibrium. If the agent who likes the public good most contributes first, less of the public good may be supplied. Similar results hold if the first mover is uncertain of the tastes of the other agent. If the agents bid for the right to move first, the agent who values the public good least will win. If each agent chooses the rate at which he will subsidize the other agent's contributions, the subsidies that support the Lindahl allocation are the unique equilibrium outcome. I also describe two related subsidy-setting games that yield Lindahl allocations in $n$-person games with general utility functions.}

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9401003.

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Date of creation: 18 Jan 1994
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9401003

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Paper
- Varian, H.R., 1991. "Sequential Provision of Public Goods," Papers 14, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Varian, H.R., 1989. "Sequential Provision Of Public Goods," Papers 89-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Varian, H.R., 1990. "Sequential Provision Of Public Goods," Papers 90-02, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H - Public Economics

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Guttman, Joel M, 1987. "A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 54(213), pages 1-19, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Ted Bergstrom, 1989. "Love and Spaghetti, The Opportunity Cost of Virtue," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1989B, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bergstrom, Ted, 1989. "Love and Spaghetti, the Opportunity Cost of Virtue," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 165-73, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Guttman, Joel M., 1986. "Matching behavior and collective action : Some experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 171-198, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Danziger, Leif & Schnytzer, Adi, 1991. "Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Groves, Theodore, 1979. "Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 227-41, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, 1976. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem'," Discussion Papers 144, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ted Bergstrom & Larry Blume & Hal Varian, 1986. "On the Private Provision of Public Goods," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1986B, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(2), pages 259-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, 1997. "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Discussion Papers 1188, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, . ""Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project''," CARESS Working Papres 99-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, . "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
- Marx, Leslie M & Matthews, Steven A, 2000. "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(2), pages 327-58, April.
Eduardo Ley, 1995. "On the Private Provision of Public Goods: A Diagrammatic Exposition," Public Economics 9503001, EconWPA, revised 15 Jul 1995. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ley, E., 1993. "On the Private Provision of Public Goods: A Diagrammatic Exposition," Papers 93-27, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- Eduardo Ley, 1996. "On the private provision of public goods: a diagrammatic exposition," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(1), pages 105-123, January. [Downloadable!]
Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence," Working Papers 0707, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence," IZA Discussion Papers 2732, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence," Post-Print halshs-00175064_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
- Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence," Post-Print halshs-00142461_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
Potters, J. & Sefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2001. "Why announce leadership contributions? : An experimental study of the signaling and reciprocity hypotheses," Discussion Paper 100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Daniel Goulao, 2005. "Review of Privade Provided Public Goods Literature," Public Economics 0501006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Wilkie, Simon & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Working Papers 1150, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ramayya Krishnan & Michael D. Smith & Zhulei Tang & Rahul Telang, 2007. "Digital Business Models for Peer-to-Peer Networks: Analysis and Economic Issue," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 6(2), pages 194-213, June. [Downloadable!]
repec:att:wimass:1919994 is not listed on IDEAS
Lise Vesterlund & Cagri Kumru, 2005. "The Effects of Status on Voluntary Contribution," Working Papers 266, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005. [Downloadable!]

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