This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Traxler, Christian

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is interpreted as a social norm for tax compliance. The norm strength, depending on the share of evaders in the society, is endogenously derived. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative, as their evasion decision depends on the other agents' compliance. We characterize an equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and study the impact of tax and deterrence policies on compliance. Our analysis is then extended to the case of a society which consists of heterogenous communities where individual evasion decisions are embedded in a complex social structure. In this scenario, behavior is crucially influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this framework, we discuss the role of belief management and belief leadership as alternative policy tools.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1202/1/Traxler_NormsEvasion.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 1202.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:1202

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Tax Evasion Tax Morale Social Norms Conditional Cooperation

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, 2005. "Attitudes Towards Paying Taxes in Austria: An Empirical Analysis," Empirica, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 231-250, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 507, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. George A. Akerlof, 1978. "A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence," Special Studies Papers 118, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    Other versions:
  4. Porcano, Thomas M., 1988. "Correlates of tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 47-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alm, James & Torgler, Benno, 2006. "Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 224-246, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Gerxhani, Klarita & Schram, Arthur, 2006. "Tax evasion and income source: A comparative experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 402-422, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bernasconi, Michele, 1998. "Tax evasion and orders of risk aversion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 123-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kirchler, Erich & Maciejovsky, Boris & Schneider, Friedrich, 2003. "Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight: Do legal differences matter?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 535-553, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Gordon, James P. P., 1989. "Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 797-805, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Falkinger, Josef, 1995. "Tax evasion, consumption of public goods and fairness," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 63-72, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, 2006. "Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp286, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Jan Schnellenbach, 2006. "Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 117-132, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Myles, Gareth D. & Naylor, Robin A., 1996. "A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Cullis, John G. & Lewis, Alan, 1997. "Why people pay taxes: From a conventional economic model to a model of social convention," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(2-3), pages 305-321, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. repec:att:wimass:199610 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Myerson, Roger B. & Pollock, Gregory B. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1991. "Viscous population equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 101-109, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Werner Güth & Vittoria Levati & Rupert Sausgruber, 2005. "Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 171-188, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Bordignon, Massimo, 1993. "A fairness approach to income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 345-362, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Hammar, Henrik & Jagers, Sverker & Nordblom, Katarina, 2005. "Tax Evasion and the Importance of Trust," Working Papers in Economics 179, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  22. Simon Gaechter, 2006. "Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications," Discussion Papers 2006-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  23. Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2007. "Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence," IZA Discussion Papers 2732, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  24. Alm, James & McClelland, Gary H. & Schulze, William D., 1992. "Why do people pay taxes?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Lars P. Feld & Benno Torgler & Bin Ding, 2008. "Coming Closer? Tax Morale, Deterrence and Social Learning after German Unification," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 232, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, revised 16 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Bin Dong & Uwe Dulleck & Benno Torgler, 2009. "Conditional Corruption," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 241, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are NEP reports in over 80 fields that deliver new research to your email.

This page was last updated on 2009-6-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.