The Role of the State in Economic Development
AbstractThis paper discusses the recent literature on the role of the state in economic development. It concludes that government incentives to enact sound policies are key to economic success. It also discusses the evidence on what happens after episodes of economic and political liberalizations, asking whether political liberalizations strengthen government incentives to enact sound economic policies. The answer is mixed. Most episodes of economic liberalizations are indeed preceded by political liberalizations. But the countries that have done better are those that have managed to open up the economy first, and only later have liberalized their political system.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000000720.
Date of creation: 02 Dec 2004
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- NEP-AFR-2004-12-12 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2004-12-12 (Development)
- NEP-HPE-2004-12-12 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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