Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union
AbstractIn this paper, we analyze coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within the EMU by focusing, in a dynamic set-up, on asymmetries, externalities, and the existence of a multi-country context. We study how coalitions among fiscal and monetary authorities are formed and what are their effects on the stabilization of output and price. In particular, our attention is directed to study the consequences on these issues of different institutional contexts in which policy-makers may act. Among other results, we found that, in the presence of externalities, the occurrence of asymmetries is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for cooperation.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 748.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
macroeconomic stabilization; EMU; coalition formation.;
Other versions of this item:
- Van Aarle B. & Di Bartolomeo G. & Engwerda J. & Plasmans J., 2002. "Staying together or breaking apart: Policy-makers' endogenous coalitions formation in the European economic and monetary Union," Working Papers 2002013, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Bas van Aarle, 2003. "Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-Makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union," Macroeconomics 0301002, EconWPA.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lukach, R. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Measuring Knowledge Spillovers using Patent Citations: Evidence from the Belgian Firm's Data," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-92281, Tilburg University.
- Peter Bofinger & Eric Mayer, 2007.
"Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the Euro Area with Different Assumptions on the Phillips Curve,"
Open Economies Review,
Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 291-305, July.
- Bofinger, Peter & Mayer, Eric, 2003. "Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the Euro area with different assumptions on the Phillips curve," W.E.P. - WÃ¼rzburg Economic Papers 40, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
- Bofinger, Peter & Mayer, Eric, 2004. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the Euro Area with different assumptions on the Phillips curve," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 27, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Bofinger, Peter & Mayer, Eric, 2004. "Monetary and Fiscal policy Interaction in the Euro Area with Different Assumptions on the Phillips Curve," CEPR Discussion Papers 4790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Bas van Aarle & Tomasz Michalak, 2005.
"Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in the EMU: Spillovers, Asymmetries, and Institutions,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1376, CESifo Group Munich.
- Joseph Plasmans & Jacob Engwerda & Bas van Aarle & Tomasz Michalak & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2006. "Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies In The Emu: Spillovers, Asymmetries And Institutions," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 53(4), pages 461-484, 09.
- Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Engwerda J. & Plasmans Jozef & Van Aarle Bas, 2003. "Macroeconomic stabilisation policies in the EMU: Spillovers, asymmetries and institutions," Working Papers 2003019, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Arghyrou, Michael G & Gadea, Maria Dolores, 2008.
"The single monetary policy and domestic macro-fundamentals: Evidence from Spain,"
Cardiff Economics Working Papers
E2008/23, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Arghyrou, Michael G. & Gadea, Maria Dolores, 2012. "The single monetary policy and domestic macro-fundamentals: Evidence from Spain," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 16-34.
- Michael G. Arghyrou & Maria Dolores Gadea, 2008. "The single monetary policy and domestic macro-fundamentals: Evidence from Spain," Documentos de Trabajo dt2008-05, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Zaragoza.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Bas van Aarle, 2005. "Monetary Unions: The Policy Coordination Issue," Macroeconomics 0504023, EconWPA.
- Joseph Plasmans & Jacob Engwerda & Bas Aarle & Tomasz Michalak, 2009. "Analysis of a monetary union enlargement in the framework of linear-quadratic differential games," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 135-156, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.